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Abstract: The issue of conflict of interests between shareholders and managers is 
interesting and widely examined. Compensation is often used to align the interests of 
managers with those of shareholders. This study aims, first, to show empirical evidence 
of the relationship between a company's performance and the manager's compensation. 
In addition, this study also examines the impact of risk preference on that relationship. 
The sample for this study of manufacturing companies listed in the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange (BEI) from 2008 to 2013. Data were obtained from annual reports, financial 
statements, and BvD Osiris. Regression analysis was employed to test the hypotheses. 
The results show that compensation is related more to accounting performance than to 
market performance. The compensation also had an impact on future accounting 
performance, but not on future market performance. However, contrary to the 
expectation, risk preference does not strengthen the relationship between future 
compensation and future performance.  After splitting the sample into three categories, 
the compensation can motivate managers to increase accounting performance only for 
companies with better performance.  
 
Keywords: Compensation, Accounting Performance, Market Performance, Risk 
Preference. 
 
Abstrak: Masalah konflik kepentingan antara pemegang saham dan manajer menarik 
dan dikaji secara luas. Kompensasi sering digunakan untuk menyelaraskan 
kepentingan manajer dengan kepentingan pemegang saham. Penelitian ini bertujuan, 
pertama, untuk menunjukkan bukti empiris tentang hubungan antara kinerja 
perusahaan dan kompensasi manajer. Selain itu, penelitian ini juga meneliti dampak 
preferensi risiko pada hubungan itu. Sampel untuk penelitian ini dari perusahaan 
manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) untuk periode 2008 hingga 
2013. Data diperoleh dari laporan tahunan, laporan keuangan, dan BvD Osiris. 
Analisis regresi digunakan untuk menguji hipotesis. Hasil menunjukkan bahwa 
kompensasi lebih terkait dengan kinerja akuntansi daripada kinerja pasar. Kompensasi 
juga berdampak pada kinerja akuntansi masa depan, tetapi tidak pada kinerja pasar di 
masa depan. Namun, bertentangan dengan ekspektasi, preferensi risiko tidak 
memperkuat hubungan antara kompensasi di masa depan dan kinerja masa depan. 
Setelah membagi sampel menjadi tiga kategori, kompensasi dapat memotivasi manajer 
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untuk meningkatkan kinerja akuntansi hanya untuk perusahaan dengan kinerja yang 
lebih baik. 
.  
Kata kunci: Kompensasi, Kinerja Akuntansi, Kinerja Pasar, Risk Preference. 
. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
A survey of Indonesian Central Bank (Bank Indonesia) shows that the 
remuneration of the board of directors of the banking industry in Indonesia was higher 
than that in Thailand, Malaysia, or the Philippines (Wiyanti, 2013). The survey shows 
that CEOs from Indonesia have the highest remuneration, while CEOs from the 
Philippines have the lowest. This phenomenon drives the Indonesian government to 
regulate the disclosure of compensation. Managers' compensation has been a concern 
not only for the academician but also for standard setters and the society at large in 
recent years (Gigliotti, 2013). While the issue of compensation has been studied 
extensively, the issue shown in the studies is mostly to develop within the U.S. 
framework. Meanwhile, in Asia,  the compensation issue is still relatively neglected 
because of data availability problems (Kato, Kim, & Lee, 2007). In Indonesia, 
compensation issues arose with the Company Act No. 40 (2007), in which the Securities 
Exchange Commission (S.E.C.) set compensation disclosures widely.  
This study aims to show the empirical evidence of the relationship between 
corporate performance, compensation, and risk preference in the period following the 
issuance of the Company Act No. 40 of 2007. The relationship between risk and return 
shows the proportional relationship. The higher the risk, the higher the expected return. 
Shareholders tend to prefer managers who are willing to take risks (risk taker) because 
the risk-taking behaviors would affect the company’s performance and thus increasing 
shareholder return (Devers et al. (2008).  Devers, Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder (2007) 
explain two theories used in the research of compensation; these theories are: (1) pay-
to-performance approaches typically drawn from motivational theory in psychology and 
(2) performance-to-pay approach grounded in agency theory.  Agency scholars suggest 
that compensation pay aligns the interest of managers and those of the shareholders by 
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curbing executive opportunism and discouraging risk aversion (Devers, Cannella, 
Reilly, & Yoder, 2007). Besides, the majority of compensation studies and practices are 
grounded in positive agency theory suggesting that since compensation ties pay to firm 
outcomes, incentive pay will reduce the threat of executive opportunism by motivating 
executives to engage in actions that maximize firm performance (Devers et al. 2007). 
Researchers included a risk preference that refers to the theory developed by Wiseman 
& Gomez-Mejia (1998), Devers et al., (2007), and Nyberg et al. (2010) to investigate 
whether compensation aligns preferences and actions between managers and 
shareholders to produce better corporate performance. Alignment occurs when manager 
preference approaches the shareholders' preference. The shareholders prefer managers 
who are risk-takers (make research and development (R&D) decision) because they 
potentially will decide to increase shareholder returns. A high return will reflect high 
performance. Agency theory predicts a conflict of interest between the shareholders and 
the managers (Jensen & Murphy, 1990a). In this theory, managers seek to maximize 
personal gain and do not consider the interests of shareholders. The condition is 
overcome by aligning the interests of owners and managers through compensation 
contracts (Jensen & Murphy, 1990a). Nyberg et al. (2010) describe the alignment of 
incentives as involving two components, namely, financial alignment and preference 
and action alignments. 
Several factors motivate this study. First, previous studies examined the 
relationship between performance and compensation (Conyon & He, 2012; 
Gunasekaragea & Wilkinson, 2002; Kato et al., 2007; Kato & Kubo, 2006; Merhebi, 
Pattenden, Swan, & Zhou, 2006; Sun, Wei, & Huang, 2013; Xiao, He, Lin, & Elkins, 
2013; Yang, Dolar, & Mo, 2014), but few studies that examined the effect of 
compensation on future performance (Banker, Huang, & Plehn-Dujowich, 2013). 
Second, research conducted by (Devers, Holcomb, & Cannella, 2006) posited that risk-
taking behaviors are related to the relationship between compensation and company 
performance.  Previous studies' results are inconsistent. One potential explanation is that 
the level of risk preference among top management teams differs. This study uses risk 
preference as a moderating variable. This study differs from previous ones in several 
The Indonesian Journal of Accounting Research – May, Vol. 22, No.2, 2019   
 
264 
 
aspects. First, previous studies only used CEO compensation, while this study uses the 
top management team's (TMT) cash compensation. In Indonesia, TMT was defined as 
the board of commissioners and board of directors. Indonesia adopts a two-tier system: 
splitting between those who run the company (board of directors) and those who 
conduct surveillance (board of commissioner).  
Hambrick & Mason (1984) were the first scholars to investigate the theory of the 
"Upper Echelons," which refers to the organization as a reflection of its top managers. 
They predict that the election strategy and organizational performance can be predicted 
from the background and characteristics of the management team. Hambrick (2007); 
Naranjo-Gil et al. (2012) explain that a collectively formed top management will 
achieve a higher performance than the team with an individualist orientation. Nguyen 
(2012)  mentions that the top management includes the CEO, CFO, and other senior 
managers to countries with a one-tier system. Second, Devers et al. (2006)  measure risk 
preference using the number of company acquisitions, whereas this study uses R&D 
costs (C. E Devers et al., 2008; Guay, 1999; Miller & Bromiley, 1990). Miller & 
Bromiley (1990)  explain nine proxies to measure risk. One of them is research and 
development costs (R&D). This study measures risk aversion using R&D because of 
data availability and the company type. Third, previous studies conducted in Indonesia 
were related to compensation in the banking industry (Sugiri, Febrianto, & Kresnawati, 
2016), while this study uses manufacturing companies listed in the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange from 2008 to 2013. This study also performs additional testing on the 
relationship between compensation and future performance based on several categories 
of companies (great, good, and poor). 
This study contributes significantly to the academia and practice. It confirms the 
behavioral agency model by adding empirical evidence on the relationship between 
performance and the compensation, and that between compensation and future 
performance. The study also provides valuable information to standard setters on the 
guidance for compensation in the company. This information is essential given that 
compensation rules in 2015 have been in force in the ASEAN Economic Community 
(A.E.C.). This A.E.C. attracts resource movement to or from Indonesia, especially of 
Utami and Kusuma 
 
265 
 
professional staff accountants. This study is for reference in designing compensation 
schemes and presenting accounting data used to evaluate performance and 
compensation. 
2. Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Company Performance with Compensation   
Result of previous studies related to the performance and compensation have been 
inconsistent. There are more than 300 studies conducted in this regard for more than 70 
years (Barkema & Gomes-Mejia, 1998). The agency theory predicts that contractual 
compensation should be tied to the performance in order to address the moral hazard 
associated with information asymmetry problem between shareholders and managers 
(Conyon & He, 2012). The study generally describes compensation as a reward for 
previous performance (Fama, 1980). Researchers often see these relationships as an 
indicator of the relationship between performance and compensation. 
The concept of sensitivity in the relationship between performance between and 
compensation is the association between the manager's wealth changes and the 
shareholder's wealth changes (Jensen & Murphy, 1990b). Jensen & Murphy (1990b) 
investigated the sensitivity of the increase in performance with compensation paid to 
the CEOs of 250 major companies in the United States for 15 years. Their results 
showed that the average total CEO compensation rises $3.25 for every $1,000 increase 
in shareholder wealth. 
Research related to the relationship between performance and compensation 
showed no association. Jensen & Murphy (1990b) and Rost & Osteroh (2009) found 
that performance was not related to compensation. One of the possible explanations is 
that managers do not necessarily work better in the use of stock compensation because 
it has long term impact, but some other studies show a positive relationship between the 
two variables (Banker et al., 2013; Conyon & He, 2012; Ghosh & Aggarwal, 2011; Kato 
& Kubo, 2006; Merhebi et al., 2006; Sun et al., 2013).  Logically, the manager will be 
compensated based on their performance (Sugiri et al., 2016). Managers with a high 
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performance get proper compensation for their achievement in raising the company's 
performance. Therefore, the first hypothesis is proposed as follows: 
H1. Company performance is positively related to the compensation of the top 
management team. 
2.2. Impact of Compensation on the Company's Future Performance 
Studies related to the compensation issue have been widely discussed, not only 
focused on the relationship between performance and compensation, but also the 
relationship between compensation and company future performance. The researchers 
examined the relationship of compensation with performance using the concept of 
compensation as a motivational tool (Devers et al., 2007). 
Devers et al. (2007) explained that there were several reasons for the lack of 
attention to the alignment between the compensation model for future performance and 
the performance model for compensation. First, the model is quite complex and requires 
a data sequence. Second, the theories for both models are different and are not always 
consistent. The compensation model for performance utilizes a motivational theory in 
psychology, while the performance for the compensation model is always based on 
agency theory. Both theories are not always met because they have different basic 
assumptions, different variables, and different research questions. However, some 
studies on the relationship between performance and compensation and the relationship 
between compensation and future performance are important if one wants to understand 
compensation. 
Banker et al. (2013)  showed that the current salary has a positive relationship with 
future performance, while the bonus is not related to future performance. Lewellen et 
al. (1992) showed a positive association between performance and compensation and 
described the design of compensation to contribute to the reduction of agency costs in 
large corporations. Additionally, Cordeiro et al. (2007)  showed that compensation was 
positively related to firm performance. The fundamental purpose of compensation is to 
motivate managers towards improving business performance. Compensation is used not 
only as a tool to motivate them to work longer on the job, but also to encourage 
managers to perform better in their tasks (Sprinkle, 2000). Thus, if the above theory is 
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valid, then compensation can motivate managers to improve the company's future 
performance. Therefore, the second hypothesis is proposed as follows: 
H2. Top management team compensation is positively related to the company's future 
performance.   
 
2.3. Compensation, Risk Preferences and Corporate Performance in the Future 
Devers et al. (2007)  organizing executive compensation studies into two 
categories, namely: (1) relationship between pay and performance and (2) relationship 
between the pay and behaviors. One of the discussion subjects in the category of the 
relationship between pay and behaviors is risk preference alignment. They explain that 
the preference for risk is aligned to the assumption that the manager will act risky, and 
is consistent with the decision of shareholders.  
Prospect theory explains that the point of individual risk preference may change 
depending on the preference level of income (Aaron, Harris, Mcdowell, & Cline, 2014). 
The differences in the compensation package are a different prospect that can be 
selected by the manager. Compensation has an important role in risk acceptance. 
Besides, Sawers et al. (2011) state that the behavioral agency model (BAM) combines 
the agency theory and the prospect theory in developing an understanding of the risk-
taking behavior of managers. Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia (1998)  examine the ability of 
compensation to increase the integration of risk preferences, and also investigate the 
extent to which compensation can increase risk-taking behavior among the managers.  
Nyberg et al. (2010) describe the alignment of incentives based on two 
components: financial alignment and preference and action alignment. The behavior of 
a manager tends to be risk-averse, whereby the majority of private wealth is invested in 
the company, and risk diversification is explicitly forbidden (Jensen & Murphy, 1990b). 
On the other hand, shareholders tend to be risk-neutral by diversifying their wealth in 
the company. Compensation is a tool for motivating managers from a risk-averse 
position to a risk-taker position. Therefore, it will increase performance. The implicit 
assumption in many studies shows a fairly strong financial alignment, followed by the 
alignment of preferences and actions (Nyberg et al., 2010). Gray & Cannella (1997) 
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concluded that managers and shareholders face very different risks. These risks are not 
always in harmony with the context of the compensation, which is closely connected 
with the reward and performance. They also found that the compensation arrangement 
does not necessarily combine salary and performance or align with the risk preferences 
of managers and shareholders. 
On the other hand, Gray & Cannella (1997) investigated the role of risk in manager 
compensation. They rearrange the compensation used to mitigate the agency problem 
as behavioral risk preferences and provide compensation for long-term performance. 
They predict that company managers in high-risk conditions should receive higher 
compensation. Evidence suggests that if companies in high-risk situations are paid low 
compensation, they find it difficult to attract and retain executives. Meanwhile, Belanes 
& Hachana (2010)  show that the company's founder and the majority of shareholders 
influence managerial risk-taking, which confirms the predictions of agency theory. The 
investors want managers to pursue its growth strategy and look for opportunities to 
improve the company's performance and competitiveness.  
Risk is defined as the extent to which uncertainty is related to the results (Sitkin & 
Pablo, 1992). The definition of risk contains three key dimensions, namely, outcomes 
uncertainty, outcome expectations, and potential outcomes. Outcome uncertainty is the 
risk associated with the uncertainty of the results, which is described by the variability 
of results, lack of knowledge about the distribution of potential outcomes, and the 
inability to control the achievement. Outcome expectations related to decisions and risk 
indicate that a positive return leads to the framing of a different decision in decision-
making behavior. Outcome potential is a considerable choice of potential consequences 
for decisions in the face of threats or inherent opportunities. This study focuses on 
outcomes expectations because of measuring risk preference using the cost of R&D 
(Devers et al., 2008; Guay, 1999; Miller & Bromiley, 1990). Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia 
(1998)  explain that the difference in the manager compensation preference implies that 
the contract could have different effects. This implies performance.  
Devers et al. (2006)  examine the alignment of objectives and the risks inherent in 
the alignment of interests separately. The results show a positive relationship between 
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the level of aggregate long-term incentives for the top management and shareholder 
returns. In addition, they also provide empirical evidence that the long-term 
compensation for the top management is associated with risk preference. Alignment 
occurs when the manager's preference approaches the shareholder's preference. The 
shareholders prefer risk-taking managers because they will make a potential decision to 
increase shareholder returns. The manager who makes the R&D decision shows the 
managers' risk-taking behavior. The greater the costs of R&D, the more willing be 
managers are to take risks and have the expectation of generating high returns. A high 
return reflects a high performance. Managers who take risks (risk takers) when the 
compensation is high will be motivated to produce better performance in the future. 
Based on the above arguments, the researchers propose a hypothesis as follows:  
H3. Risk-taking preference strengthens the relationship between Top Management 
Team compensation and the company's performance in the future. 
 
3. Research Methods 
The study sample comprised of manufacturing companies in Indonesia listed in the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange in the period 2008 to 2013. Companies in the manufacturing 
industry were used as a sample because different types of industries have different 
compensation disclosures principles. Companies are selected through purposive 
sampling, with the following criteria: (a) manufacturing companies that published 
annual report data and the financial reports for the period 2008-2013, (b) companies that 
disclosed top management compensation (board of directors and board of 
commissioners), and (c) the companies that have relevant data. 
3.1. Variable Measurement 
Top management compensation in the form of cash compensation consists of 
compensation for the board of directors and the board of commissioners. Cash 
compensation is the amount of salary and annual bonus (Cheng, 2004). In Indonesia, 
the compensation data includes the salary, benefits, and bonuses or gratification in the 
form of cash. The data was collected manually from the annual reports on corporate 
governance or financial statements from the notes to the Financial Statements.  
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Compensation= Salary + Benefits + Bonuses (Gratification) 
 
Company performance uses a proxy-based on accounting and the markets (Conyon 
& He, 2012). Accounting measurements were made using a return on assets (Grace, 
2004; Kato & Kubo, 2006), and the market measurement was by using the stock return 
(Conyon & He, 2012; Parthasarathy, Menon, & Bhattacherjee, 2006). The data was 
obtained from BvD Osiris and Yahoo Finance. 
 
ROA = Net Income / Total Assets 
Return = (Pt - Pt-1) / Pt-1 
where: 
Pt   = Stock price at the end period t 
Pt-1= Stock price at the end period t-1 
 
Risk preference is the tendency to taking risks associated with the company. The 
costs of R&D are used to measure risk preference (Devers et al., 2008; Guay, 1999; 
Miller & Bromiley, 1990). Decision made by the managers about R&D reflects the 
extent to which managers dare to invest in uncertainty and potentially on the value, 
whereby this act can strategically increase shareholder wealth (Miller & Bromiley, 
1990). The data  R&D   costs were taken from BVD Osiris and the company's financial 
statements. The costs were only found (disclosed) in the manufacturing sector. 
Two control variables were used, namely firm size (Belanes & Hachana, 2010; 
Xiao et al., 2013) and leverage (Haron & Akhtaruddin, 2013). The firm size was 
measured by the logarithm of total assets, while leverage was used to measure the 
funding decisions of the firm. Managers of bigger companies were expected to get 
higher pay compares to those of smaller companies because of differences in the level 
of the task and decision complexity that must be completed (Doucouliagos, Haman, & 
Askary, 2007). The higher the leverage, the greater the risk level of the company. 
Leverage was measured using total debt divided by the total assets. The data used as a 
proxy for the control variable was obtained from BVD Osiris and the company's 
financial statements. 
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Leverage= Total Debt / Total Assets 
 
3.2. Research Model 
This study uses regression analysis to analyze the relationship between the 
performance of the company, top management compensation, and risk preferences. The 
regression equations are as follows. 
Regression equation hypothesis 1:  
Compi, t = α + β1Perfi, t + β2SZi, t + β3LVi, t + ℮ 
 
Regression equation for hypotheses 2 and 3: 
 Perfi,t+1 = α + β1Compi,t + β2SZi,t + β3LVi,t + e 
 
For testing hypothesis 3, the same regression is performed under two split samples based 
on the risk preference. 
  
where:  
Perfi,t+1 = Performance i for time  t+1 
Perfi,t = Performance i for time t 
Compi,t = Top Management Compensation from country i for time t 
SZi,t = Firm size from country i for time t 
LVi,t = Leverage from country i for time t 
 
3.3. Additional Test  
An additional test was conducted by providing empirical evidence for the 
relationship between top management compensation and the company's performance 
based on the company category (Murphy, 1998). Companies were categorized into three 
categories: great, good, and poor. The company's performance regarding both the ROA 
and return are sorted (separately) from the highest to the lowest and then divided into 
three as follows: 25% for top performance (great), 50% performance of the middle 
(good), and 25% of lowest performance (poor).  
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4. Result and Discussions 
The total sample for each test model is different. Table 1 presents the sample 
selection procedure is as follows: 
Table 1  
Sample Selection 
Criteria 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 2   
(Full Sample) 
Return ROA Return ROA 
The number of samples 
manufacturing company period 
2008-2013 
810 810 675 675 
Companies with incomplete data 208 188 177 172 
Samples that fulfill the Purposive 
Sampling 
602 622 498 503 
Outlier* 30 31 9 20 
Final sample 572 591 489 483 
* Outliers are deleted based on ZScore (below and above -3 and +3 removed from the sample). 
 
Table 2   
Sample Selection Based on the Classification Testing 
Criteria 
R&D: High R&D: Low 
Return ROA Return ROA 
Company disclose R&D 38 40 38 38 
Outlier 1 0 1 0 
Final sample   37 40 37 38 
 
Table 2 presents the sample selection based on classification testing. The sample "R&D: 
High" and sample "R&D: Low" are classified based on the median of research and 
development (R&D). 
4.1. Testing the Relationship Between Performance and Compensation 
Table 3 presents an overview of the descriptive statistics of each variable for the 
first hypothesis. The values of mean and median for all variables, whether the returns 
or ROA measures the performance, do not differ significantly. The mean and median 
are not much different, indicating that the data are normally distributed. The standard 
deviation of all variables except that measured by the ROA is relatively low. 
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Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics on the Compensation Performance Testing 
 
Variable Min Max Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Performance (Return) 
Ln_Compensation 12.637 19.780 15.682 15.645 1.304 
Performance (return) -0.950 9.926 0.262 0.343 0.912 
Log_TA 17.680 25.211 20.997 20.837 1.503 
Leverage  0.000 3.342 0.557 0.476 0.477 
Performance (ROA) 
Ln_Compensation 12.637 19.780 15.640 15.624 1.299 
Performance (ROA) -32.950 56.920 7.972 6.380 11.560 
Log_TA 17.703 25.211 20.977 20.829 1.482 
Leverage  0.000 3.342 0.539 0.473 0.447 
 
Table 4 shows the results of regression for the first hypothesis for both the market 
and accounting performances. 
Table 4  
Regression Analysis of the Compensation Performance Testing 
 
Variable 
Return ROA 
Coef t Sig Coef t Sig 
Constanta 1.659 3.524 0.000 2.271 5.165 0.000 
Performance 0.017 0.481 0.631 0.020 6.362 0.000* 
Log_TA 0.675 30.589 0.000* 0.636 31.012 0.000* 
Leverage  -0.292 -4.200 0.000* -0.240 -3.203 0.001* 
*Significant at alpha 5% 
 
The first hypothesis states that compensation is positively related to performance.  
For market performance, the return is not significant (sig=0.631). This result suggests 
that market performance is not positively related to compensation. This result fails to 
support the first hypothesis. For the accounting performance, the return is significant 
(sig=0.000). This result shows that consistent with the hypothesis, accounting 
performance has a positive and significant relationship with the compensation.  
Top management compensation in manufacturing companies in Indonesia depends 
more on accounting performance rather than market performance, particularly 
evidenced by the accounting performance measured by ROA. The higher the ROA, the 
more managers effectively use the assets for the benefit of shareholders (Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006). High ROA also reflects the use of assets effectively in serving the 
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economic interests of shareholders (Ibrahim & Samad, 2011). A company that performs 
well regarding in the ROA indicates managerial success in the firm.   
The results of these studies suggest a way to align the interests of top management 
and shareholders by increasing work motivation through accounting performance. 
Managers are paid more when they work to improve the accounting performance of the 
company as an internal input rather than to increase the stock price (Conyon & He, 
2012). This result supports the study by Conyon & He (2012), which concluded that the 
accounting performance is stronger than market performance. However, Conyon & He 
(2012) proved that both measurement models (return and ROA) show significant 
results. This study is important for top management in making a business plan. 
Companies prioritize accounting performance over the market performance, particularly 
concerning the compensation received.  
The relationship between market performance (return) and top management 
compensation is not supported. Market performance is weak and unsupported because 
it is influenced by economic and political factors (Conyon & He, 2012). The top 
management is more difficult to use for controlling and regulating market performance 
within a broad scope and with the involvement of external parties. The market 
performance will be influenced by many parties (government, investors, the economic 
environment both domestically and abroad), so the manager is not able to regulate the 
conditions as desired. This study supports research by Kato & Kubo (2006)  and 
Merhebi et al. (2006). The results (H1) support the agency theory only on performance 
as measured by accounting performance (ROA). 
Company size as a control variable for both models of performance measurement, 
namely return and ROA, is significant (sig=0.000) and has a positive coefficient. The 
total asset is positively related to top management compensation. Companies that have 
big assets, the company, compensate higher for the manager. Leverage as control 
variables in both models are also significant (sig=0.000 and 0.001) and possess a 
negative coefficient. 
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4.2. Testing on the Effect of Compensation on Future Performance and Risk 
Preferences 
Table 5 presents the overall descriptive statistics for the variables. As expected, 
Table 5 is similar to Table 3, with the only difference is the number of firms used. 
 
Table 5  
Descriptive Statistics Tests Compensation to Future Performance 
 
Variable Min Max Mean Median Std. Dev. 
       Performance (FReturn) 
Ln_Compensation 12.339 20.606 15.579 15.589 1.324 
Performance (FReturn) -0.923 2.817 0.241 0.069 0.611 
Log_TA 17.680 25.929 20.919 20.795 1.503 
Leverage  0.000 144.162 0.850 0.474 6.512 
    Performance (FROA) 
Ln_Compensation 12.339 19.584 15.540 15.550 1.274 
Performance (FROA) -30.780 47.360 8.043 6.810 10.333 
Log_TA 17.680 24.887 20.868 20.737 1.452 
Leverage  0.000 3.210 0.550 0.472 0.468 
 
Table 6 presents the regression results of compensation and future performance.  
Future performance is proxied by market performance (return) and accounting 
performance (ROA). 
Table 6  
Regression Analysis Testing Compensation and Future Performance 
 
Variable 
FReturn FROA 
Coef T Sig Coef t Sig 
Constanta 0.319 0.815 0.415 -5.525 -0.786 0.432 
Ln_Compensation -0.007 -0.242 0.809 2.087 4.284 0.000* 
Log_TA 0.001 0.053 0.958 -0.775 -1.817 0.070 
Leverage  0.009 2.171 0.030* -4.893 -2.976 0.003* 
*Significant at alpha 5% 
 
For market performance, compensation is not significant (p=0.809). These results 
suggest that top management compensation is not positively related to return. This result 
fails to support the second hypothesis. However, for accounting performance, the 
impact of compensation is significant (p=0.000). It shows that compensation is 
positively related to the ROA, thus supporting the second hypothesis. 
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Compensation for the manager can motivate managers to work better for future 
accounting performance. A company’s accounting performance is governed by the 
manager and restricted by standards set by the profession so that the performance is 
influenced by accounting practices, for example, the methods used for the assessment 
of tangible and intangible assets (Kapopoulos & Lazaretou, 2007). Accounting 
performance is easier planned than market performance because it involves only internal 
parties, while market performance is a product of various parties. 
The relationship between compensation and accounting performance in the future 
can align the interests of managers and shareholders. Managers get a high reward and 
are motivated to create a good future performance. Conversely, it has not been proven 
that the top management compensation can motivate managers to improve market 
performance in the future. Measurements of the performance-based market are 
characterized by various aspects in the future and reflect future expectations of the 
shareholders (Ganguli & Agrawal, 2015; Shan & McIver, 2011; Wahla, Shah, & 
Hussain, 2012). Market performance can reflect future opportunities that come from 
outside factors for managerial decisions and are indicated by the company level (Shan 
& McIver, 2011). More factors affect market performance than accounting 
performance. These factors make managers not keen to focus on the market's 
performance in relation to the compensation received. The result (H2) supports the 
explanation given by  Devers et al., (2007) that compensation can motivate managers to 
work better as reflected by future company performance based on accounting 
performance (ROA). 
Control variables for company size are not related to the company's performance 
in the future for both models. However, leverage is positively associated with the future 
performance of the market. On the other hand, the leverage in the corporate performance 
measurement model using accounting performance (ROA) is negatively associated with 
performance in the future. 
Table 7 and Table 8 present the descriptive statistics split samples. The sample is 
divided based on the magnitude of R&D: High and Low. The standard deviation of all 
variables on split samples in which the performance measurement was done using 
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returns, showed small standard deviations. The relatively small standard deviations 
indicate individual data points close to the average. On the other hand, the standard 
deviation of performance variables measured by ROA shows a high value (12.176 and 
9.736) for R&D High and R&D Low, respectively. The mean and median for Table 7 
and Table 8 show that the values of all variables are relatively similar. 
 
Table 7  
Descriptive Statistics Split Sample (Performance=Return) 
 
Variable Min Max Mean Median Std. Dev. 
“R&D High” 
Ln_Compensation 14.039 18.385 16.435 16.916 1.481 
Performance (FReturn) -0.697 1.462 0.268 0.212 0.474 
Log_TA 18.420 23.990 21.735 22.313 1.623 
Leverage  0.058 0.799 0.332 0.302 0.177 
                                                                     “R&D Low” 
Ln_Compensation 12.339 18.039 15.307 14.655 1.504 
Performance (FReturn) -0.590 2.150 0.260 0.164 0.552 
Log_TA 18.407 24.003 21.058 20.656 1.428 
Leverage  0.027 0.825 0.368 0.340 0.212 
 
Table 8  
Descriptive Statistics Split Sample   (Performance=ROA) 
 
Variable Min Max Mean Median Std. Dev. 
“R&D High” 
Ln_Compensation 14.039 18.385 16.501 16.946 1.444 
Performance (FROA) -14.240 52.950 16.786 15.715 12.176 
Log_TA 18.420 23.991 21.777 22.357 1.592 
Leverage  0.058 0.799 0.319 0.301 0.176 
“R&D Low” 
Ln_Compensation 12.339 18.039 15.265 14.688 1.431 
Performance (FROA) -11.960 35.940 9.510 7.355 9.736 
Log_TA 18.407 24.003 20.990 20.517 1.387 
Leverage  0.027 0.914 0.398 0.353 0.226 
 
Table 9 and Table 10 present the results of the regression analysis of split samples for 
performance based on return and ROA. 
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Table 9 
 Regression Analysis of Split Samples (Performance=Return) 
 
Variable 
FReturn FReturn 
“R&D: High” “R&D: Low” 
Coef t Sig Coef T Sig 
Constanta 0.892 0.827 0.414 2.115 1.459 0.154 
Ln_Compensation -0.158 -1.452 0.156 -0.139 -1.135 0.265 
Log_TA 0.092 0.927 0.360 0.013 0.105 0.917 
Leverage  -0.112 -0.239 0.812 -0.038 0.088 0.930 
 
Table 10  
Regression Analysis of Split Samples (Performance=ROA) 
 
Variable 
FROA FROA 
“R&D: High” “R&D: Low” 
Coef t Sig Coef T Sig 
Constanta -56.281 -3.732 0.000 -32.913 -1.539 0.133 
Ln_Compensation 1.647 0.650 0.520 -2.113 -1.574 0.125 
Log_TA 2.597 1.177 0.247 3.811 2.397 0.022 
Leverage  -33.369 -3.602 0.000 -13.408 -2.482 0.018 
 
Table 9 shows that compensation (for both levels of FReturn) is not significant 
(sig=0.156 and 0.265). This suggests that compensation is not positively related to 
future market performance for both high and low levels of R&D. Since both are 
insignificant, there is no difference in the association between compensation and future 
market performance at different levels. Therefore, risk preference does not moderate the 
association between compensation and future market performance. This result fails to 
support the third hypothesis. 
Table 10 shows that compensation for high R&D and low R&D are not significant 
(sig=0.520 and 0.125). This also suggests that, like the future market performance 
results, risk preference does not moderate the association between compensation and 
future performance. Therefore, the third hypothesis is unsupported. The result does not 
confirm the BAM. 
When used as control variables, the total assets and leverage did not show a 
significant impact on the "R&D: High" and "R&D: Low" for future market performance 
(return). Total assets showed significant results in "R&D: Low" for the performance of 
accounting, while the leverage variable was not significant. Split sample in "R&D: 
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High" for the accounting performance measurement shows that both control variables 
are not significant. Risk preference does not strengthen or weaken the relationship 
between compensation and the company's future performance using either market 
performance measurement or accounting performance. In Indonesia, especially for 
manufacturing companies, managers select the risk preference policy in setting R&D 
(risk takers), which does not align the preferences of managers to those of shareholders. 
The results suggest a possibility that managers focus only on performance in the short 
term. Cash compensation is synonymous with short-term performance, while stock 
compensation is associated with the long-term. Companies carry out R&D just because 
there is a demand for their products. Only a few firms in Indonesia carry out R&D in 
regular and sustained periods. The risk-taker condition does not imply that 
compensation will motivate the company's future performance. The results contradict 
studies conducted by Nyberg et al. (2010), which state that a strong financial harmony 
will be followed by the alignment of the preferences and actions. However, this study 
is in line with the results of Gray & Cannella (1997), which showed that compensation 
arrangements are not necessarily linked to the performance neither do they align the risk 
preferences of managers and shareholders.  
 
4.3. Additional Test 
The purpose of the additional test was to provide empirical evidence of the 
relationship between top management compensation and the company's performance in 
the future based on the companies' performance category  (Murphy, 1998). Table 11 
presents the results of additional tests as follows: 
Table 11  
Result of Additional Test 
Variable 
 
FReturn                FROA 
Coef t Sig Coef t Sig 
Great 
Ln Compensation 0.005 0.297 0.767 1.445 1.792 0.076 
Good 
Ln_Compensation 0.009 0.734 0.464 0.813 2.868 0.005 
Poor 
Ln_Compensation -0.031 -0.560 0.576 -0.283 -0.602 0.548 
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Further test results show that the provision of compensation will motivate 
managers to improve only the future accounting performance of the company in the 
good category. Compensation is not related to market performance in all of the company 
categories. This study supports the research conducted by Medina (2010) on companies 
in the United States, which showed that companies in the good category show a 
relationship between future compensation and accounting performance. Managers who 
work in a company that is in the good category through the provision of compensation, 
are required to provide higher accounting performance. 
 
5. Conclusion, Limitation, and Recommendation 
This study supports the hypothesis of the relationship between a company's 
performance, which is measured based on accounting performance (ROA) and the top 
management compensation. However, these results do not support the relationship 
between market performances (return) and top management compensation. The test 
results demonstrate that managers will receive substantial compensation when higher 
empirical accounting performances are achieved.   
Compensation as a tool to motivate the company's future performance in the future 
is supported only on accounting performance (ROA), but not for market performance. 
The higher the compensation received by the manager, the more likely it is that they 
will be motivated to produce stronger accounting performance in the future. 
Compensation is based more strongly on accounting performance, whereas it also has 
an impact on future accounting performance. This does not apply to market 
performance. Market performance is not affected by compensation. R&D decision 
making (risk preference) in Indonesian manufacturing companies has not been proven 
to strengthen or weaken the relationship between top management compensation and 
the company's future performance. Although financial alignment occurs, it is not 
necessarily followed by the alignment of the preferences and management actions. 
Additional tests also prove that the compensation will motivate managers to 
increase accounting performance in the future only in the category of good company. 
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Performance measurement based on the market performance for the great, good, and 
poor company, and it shows that the compensation does not motivate managers to work 
better. 
Companies in Indonesia do not disclose details of their based on their components 
(salaries, allowances, and bonuses). Disclosure of compensation based on its 
components can explain in greater detail, according to research conducted by Banker et 
al. (2013). Besides that, future research considers the subjective aspects of the individual 
(Tjahjono, 2011). This study has limitations in performance measurement, which are 
based on accounting performance and market performance. This study only uses return 
for the market performance and ROA for accounting performance. Various proxies for 
measuring the performance of both market performance and the accounting 
performance should be considered in future studies. Results on the relationship between 
market performance and top management compensation and the relationship between 
compensation and future market performance show no significant relations. It is 
important to study this relationship in greater depth to gain a more comprehensive 
explanation, especially related to market performance.  
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